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18 January 1962

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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


4. USSR: No valid evidence supports press speculation that Khrushchev's leadership may be in jeopardy. (*Page iii*)

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6. Cuba: Castro may be planning increased harassment of Guantanamo. (*Page iv*)




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8. Japan: Pro-Communists and moderates expect showdown fight for party control at Japanese Socialist convention 20 January. (*Page v*)

9. Watch Committee Conclusions. (*Page vi*)

10. LATE ITEM: Dominican Republic. (*Page vii*)

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\*USSR: Despite widespread press speculation that Khrushchev's authority may be in jeopardy, his public activities since the 22nd party congress appear to have been at the same high level as during the pre-congress period, with the exception of the first week in January when he apparently suffered an attack of influenza. He has made numerous speeches, toured the Soviet provinces, chaired high-level meetings, conferred with foreign and bloc officials; in short, has been involved in what is for him a normal round of activities.

The treatment of Khrushchev's activities in the Soviet press and references to him by other Soviet officials continue to reflect acknowledgment and praise for his leading role, though this praise, in line with Khrushchev's attack on the cult of personality, is somewhat more restrained than before the congress. Khrushchev continues to be the only top Soviet leader cited by Soviet officials and the public media as the authority on internal and external matters.

Pravda's attack on 17 January against Molotov's "dogmatic obstinacy" in opposing Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence policy would seem to invalidate speculation that Molotov's return to Vienna would indicate rehabilitation and a political defeat for Khrushchev. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Cuba: Increasing Cuban harassment of employees of the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay and stepped-up Cuban military activity in the base environs may presage a propaganda campaign to force US withdrawal from the base, but a Cuban military attack on the base is unlikely. Castro has scheduled a new "assembly of the Cuban people" for 28 January in Havana, postponed from 22 January, apparently to deal with the OAS foreign ministers' meeting. At the last such mass rally, in September 1960, Castro, among other things, warned that if "aggression" against Cuba continues, a new "assembly of the people will be convened" to demand US withdrawal from the base. The Castro regime claims that the purpose of the meeting of American foreign ministers opening in Uruguay on 22 January is to formulate "new aggressions" against Cuba.

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Castro could curtail base activity by cutting off most of the labor supply--about two thirds of the 3,500 workers live outside the base--but this would deny his government approximately \$6,000,000 in badly needed foreign exchange it receives each year from the base payroll. Alternate sources of water are available if the Cubans cut off the base water supply which is now provided by Cuban sources. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board on 17 January reached the following conclusion concerning Cuba:

The possibility of a Cuban air attack on Guantanamo Naval Base [REDACTED] is [REDACTED]

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[redacted] considered unlikely, but the Castro regime may engage in spectacular demonstrations to coincide with the OAS conference scheduled to begin 22 January. [redacted]

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Japan: Pro-Communist and moderate leftists will fight for control of the Japanese Socialist party at a three-day national convention beginning 20 January during which the party will attempt to formulate plans for the mid-1962 upper house elections. The struggle centers on the attempt by extremist elements to replace Secretary General Saburo Eda, whose more moderate position aided the Socialists in the 1960 election. A party mission to Peiping on 13 January sought to undermine the moderates by once again joining the Chinese Communist public in a statement designating "US imperialism as the common enemy of the Japanese and Chinese people." Uniform Tokyo press denunciation of the Communist line and of Socialist "subservience to a foreign power" may strengthen the moderates. Socialist strength and influence have been weakened by the internal struggle, but if the extremists gain control of the party apparatus, it is almost certain to result in a reversion to more militant mass action. [redacted]

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## WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.

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**BERLIN:** Communist military activity, as in recent weeks, does not suggest that the Communists expect to risk serious military confrontation over Berlin in the immediate future. Harassments over access and over East-West contacts, however, can be expected to continue.

**LAOS:** Although it is unlikely that there will be any large increase in military activity in Laos while the three factions are meeting in Geneva, localized military engagements will probably continue.

**SOUTH VIETNAM:** Viet Cong subversive and small-scale military activity continues at a high rate, despite counteractions in various regions by government forces. The Viet Cong has the capability of conducting large-scale attacks on preselected targets in some areas of the country at any time.

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**CUBA:** (Carried on Page iv of Daily Brief)

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**\*Dominican Republic:** (Information as of 0330 EST) The civilian-military junta imposed by General Rodriguez Echevarria on 16 January can be maintained only by strongly repressive measures. At its inception, it faces widespread public repudiation, the active opposition of all organized political groups, and disunity within the armed forces themselves.

The two holdovers from the ousted Council of State, Antonio Imbert and Luis Amiana Tio, were apparently surprised by their retention in the new junta. They told an American Embassy officer on 17 January that they intend to repudiate Rodriguez' action and call for the restoration of the former Council as the only legitimate government. Other junta members have little if any public following and the new regime will have to depend to a large extent on individuals discredited during the Trujillo era. The nominal president of the junta, Huberto Bogaert is a little known lawyer and former Trujillo cabinet minister from General Rodriguez' home area. One of the military members, army Lt. Colonel Nival Seijas, developed a widely accepted reputation for brutality under Trujillo.

Bogaert's address of 17 January, in which he echoed General Rodriguez' claims that the "Communist threat" necessitated the change in government, will remind many Dominicans of the similar rationalizations for repressive action employed by the late dictator. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Mean-  
while, the genuine Communist threat may grow as more Dominicans feel impelled toward violent action [REDACTED]

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Status of Foreign Assistance to Ghana's Armed Forces

[Nkrumah's regime has been holding intermittent consultations with the USSR on possible Soviet military assistance at least since late 1960. At that time Moscow offered to furnish all needed equipment--including a wide range of aircraft--for a large-scale, long-term military development program. While Nkrumah was visiting the bloc last summer, he accepted a Soviet offer to train up to 400 cadets for Ghana's three military services; the first contingent of 75 trainees arrived in the USSR in October. Of these, nine are reportedly receiving pilot training. Bloc arms deliveries to date have apparently been limited to the approximately 7,000 cases of small arms which arrived in Ghana last April. These were reportedly intended for Gizenga's Stanleyville regime, but they were never delivered.]

[Meanwhile, Nkrumah in recent months has sharply reduced the previous dependence of his armed forces on UK support--a move inspired by his desire to play a leading role in the scheme for a "joint high command" being developed by the Casablanca group of radical African states. In September he dismissed his British chief of staff and ordered the removal of British officers--there were then over 200 attached to the Ghanaian armed forces--from command and executive positions. He agreed to accept a British military advisory mission but has procrastinated on its formal establishment. It now appears that this mission, when finally established, will be small, including an army contingent of no more than 50 officers. At present there are still about 130 UK officers in Ghana. On the other hand, Nkrumah's government has indicated its interest in retaining and even strengthening a small Canadian training team. Accra has also expressed gratification over Washington's recent agreement to accept a number of Ghanaian junior officers and enlisted specialists in US service schools. The special interest which was displayed by Ghanaian defense officials in publicizing this arrangement may have reflected a desire to offset in advance the effect in the West of new Ghanaian military arrangements with the USSR.]

### Bitter Controversy Expected at Japanese Socialist Convention


Basic to the dispute between the pro-Communist and moderate leftist elements are two factors: the power aspirations of individual faction leaders, and the Japanese Socialist party's (JSP) inability to choose between seeking its goals by parliamentary means or relying on extraparliamentary mass action and violence.

Public criticism of JSP extremism in the struggle against the US-Japanese security treaty in 1960 caused the party to adopt the "structural reform program" aimed at achieving a socialist state by constitutional means. This new program helped the JSP recover its prestige in time to gain 23 seats in the lower house elections of November 1960 at the expense of the more moderate Democratic Socialist party.

In recent months, however, extreme leftists in the party have become increasingly restive over Secretary General Saburo Eda's de-emphasis of political struggles, of the class party concept, and of ties with the Communists. Intent on ousting Eda, the extremists are supporting Kozo Sasaki for the secretary generalship. An open convention fight appears almost certain.

The JSP mission to Peiping, headed by former party chairman Mosaburo Suzuki, had indicated a desire to avoid political entanglements with the Chinese Communists. Suzuki's acquiescence in the "common enemy" statement, probably under pressure from extremists in his delegation, was a reaffirmation of a statement by the late JSP chairman, Inejiro Asanuma, when he led a party delegation to Peiping in 1959. Asanuma's adherence to the "Communist line" precipitated a split in the JSP and led to the formation of the moderate Democratic Socialist party in January 1960.

Strong adverse reaction to the "common enemy" statement almost certainly has damaged the party's election prospects,



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although there is still time for it to regain a moderate posture before the upper house elections in July. The intraparty effect is more difficult to assess. Most informed observers believed before Suzuki's statement that Eda was losing ground in his efforts to retain office against the extremists' challenge, despite his having drafted for convention approval a program that meets the left-wing demands for a more militant course. There now is a considerable chance, however, that Suzuki's action may have backfired and actually damaged the extremists in their effort to gain control of the party. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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The Attorney General

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